Taiwan at the crossroads by Hang-Sheng Cheng
FABSF WEEKLY LETTEA
Number 94-07, February 18, 1994
Taiwan at the Crossroads
Taiwan's sustained rapid economic growth over
the past three decades has been hailed over the
world as a shining example ofthe "East Asian
economic miracle:' This remarkable economic
performance has lifted its populace from general
poverty in the early 1950s to a level of prosperity
and wealth that is now the envy of the develop-
ing world. But Taiwan's growth engine seems to
be "losing steam:' Reduced output growth, lower
domestic investment, high labor and land costs,
and a rising tide of industries moving abroad
have raised concerns about its continued com-
petitiveness in the world economy.
This Letter argues that Taiwan's current economic
problems are normal symptoms of an economy
entering the stage of a "mature industrial econ-
omy;' with structural changes that reflect Tai-
wan's changing comparative advantage in the
world economy. Misinterpretation of the symp-
toms has led to market pessimism and slow-
downs in private investment. In addition, past
rapid growth has left infrastructure investment
behind, resulting in widespread production bot-
tlenecks and environment deterioration, thus
further dampening private investment incentives.
The appropriate government policy response to
these problems must aim at facilitating the transi-
tion and strengthening the economy's industrial
base for continued growth. The government's cur-
rent large investments in transportation, science
and technology development, and environmental
improvement are consistent with this diagnosis.
In addition, the government also has significantly
lowered barriers to imports and liberalized its fi-
nancial markets. Successful implementation of
these measures will help ensure Taiwan's sus-
tained growth and prosperity as a maturing in-
dustrial economy.
losing steam?
Between 1952 and 1992, Taiwan's per capita in-
come rose from less than US$200 to slightly over
$10,000, resulting in dramatic increases in living
standards: the proportion of households having
electricity rose from 33 percent to 99.7 percent,
those with tap water rose from 29 percent to 88
percent, and the population's average life expec-
tancy increased from 58 years to 74 years. While
justifiably proud of its record, in recent years Tai-
wan has become increasingly concerned about
the future of its economy. The concern stems
from several considerations.
First, the annual average output growth rate de-
clined from 10 percent in the 1970s t08 percent
in the 1980s and to 6 percent in the early 1990s.
Industrial output growth fell steadily from an
average of 16 percent a year in the 1960s to 13
percent in the 1970s, to 8 percent in the first
seven years ofthe 1980s, and to only 3.5 percent
in the last five years. Equally disturbing is the de-
cline in the domestic fixed-investment rate from
an average of 28 percent a year in 1974-82 to an
average of 22 percent in the last five years. Pri-
vate domestic investment in particular, which
boomed in the second halfof the 1980s,actually
fell from 1989 to 1991. These figures raise fears
that the economy is "losing steam:'
Second, currency appreciation and rising labor
and land costs may have undercut Taiwan's trade
competitiveness. Between 1985 and 1989, the
value of the Taiwanese currency appreciated 52
percent against the U.S. dollar. Although it was
not as large as the 100 percent appreciation of
the Japanese yen from 1984 to 1988, Taiwan's
economy is likely to have sustained a propor-
tionately larger shock than Japan did, in view of
the fact that Taiwan's exports account for more
than 40 percent of its total output, compared to
only about 10 percent in Japan. Since 1985, man-
ufacturing wages in Taiwan have increased 114
percent, compared to only a 20 percent rise in
the U.S., its largest export market accounting for
one-third of its total exports. It is well known,
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although systematic data are lacking, that urban
and industrial land prices in Taiwan have sky-
rocketed since 1985, making it one of the world's
most expensive places to build a factory or a
home.
Third, the high costs of production in Taiwan
have accelerated the exodus of its core manu-
facturing industries-namely, textiles, shoes,
plastics, and light machinery. Starting in 1987,
soon after Taiwan's currency appreciation, manu-
facturers began moving plants and equipment to
Southeast Asian countries, especially Malaysia,
where land was cheap and wages were low. By
1990, manufacturers in Taiwan "discovered"
China, with even lower wages and land prices.
An official estimate stated in early 1993 that be-
tween 6,000 and 7,000 firms in Taiwan had in-
vested in Mainland China, although less than
one-half (2,700) had registered with the Taiwan
government; in terms of value, the registered in-
vestments amounted to US$2 billion, but the
same estimate put the actual total at five to ten
times that amount. Even more disconcerting, ap-
parently some of the more technology-intensive
industries-such as electronics, plastics, and pre-
cision machinery- have begun moving to China.
As the "China fever" spreads through the econ-
omy, there are growing concerns about the "ho!-
lowing out" ofthe Taiwanese economy and rising
competition from China in world trade.
Growing into economic maturity
These symptoms of Taiwan's "losing steam" are
signs of a maturing economy. in the early stage of
economic development, output growth is high to
the extent that resources can be shifted from less
efficient to more efficient uses and world tech-
nology can be absorbed relatively cheaply. Even-
toally, as possibilities of resource shifts dwindle
and the economy has absorbed most ofthe read-
ily available, low-cost world technology, output
growth decelerates and approaches a rate deter-
mined by its factor-supply growth and its own
technology innovation. During this process, en-
hanced factor productivity leads to currency
appreciation, and increased labor and land
scarcity lead to higher wages and land costs.
The exodus of industries also is part of Taiwan's
economic maturing. Wh;;lt is "hollowingout" is
not the Taiwanese economy itself, but the tradi-
tional industries that are no longer internationally
competitive because of high wages and land
costs. In their place, what is "filling in" are more
capital and technology-intensive industries that
can afford to pay the high wages and high land
costs and still compete in world trade. Even the
recent exodus of "high-tech" industries may be
more apparent than real. "High-tech" is relative,
and industrial classification is seldom fine enough
to reveal the different gradations of technological
intensity of an industry's subgroups. On the basis
of mature industrial economies' experiences, one
can infer that Taiwan has been losing firms on
the labor-intensive and "low-tech" end of these
industries, leaving the capital-intensive and truly
"high-tech" segments at home.
Indirect empirical supportfor this view is not
hard to find. If significant hollowing out has oc-
curred without adequate filling in, then the un-
employment rate would have risen since i985
when all the allegedly adverse factors-currency
appreciation, rising wages and land costs, ex-
odus of industries-began. On the contrary,
however, the unemployment rate in Taiwan has
averaged 1.6 percent since 1987 (not 1985, in
order to allow for adjustment lags), which is
about the same as the average of 1.7 percent in
the 1970s and significantly lower than the aver-
age of 2.5 percent from 1981 to 1986. Indeed, the
problem in Taiwan today is not that high wages
are driving out jobs, but that there is a labor
shortage, especially at the lower end ofthe wage
scale, which has attracted a large number of im-
migrant workers-just as in mature industrial
economies.
AlthoughTaiwan's employment structure has un-
dergone significant shifts since 1985 away from
manufacturing towards services (manufacturing's
share in total employment in 1992 was 30 per-
cent, down from 33 percent in 1985), it would be
misleading to cite this shift as evidence of indus-
trial "hollowing out." The shifts actually started
about 1980, when industrial employment, espe-
cially in manufacturing, began to decline relative
to total employment, while the relative rise in
service employment accelerated. Similar shifts
have been observed in all mature industrial
economies, including the U.S., Japan, and many
European countries.
These shifts in Taiwan's employment structure
have been accompanied by an astonishing accel-
eration of labor productivity growth since 1985.
From 1970 to 1980, each additional worker in
Taiwan added NT$56,OOO (New Taiwan dollars)
in constant 1986 prices to total output. This gross
marginal productivity of labor increased to
NT$85,OOO in 1980-1985 and to NT$160,OOO in1985-1992. Though this measure is crude, it still
makes clear that labor in Taiwan became more,
rather than less, productive after 1985, despite
the massive exodus of industry.
Those concerned about Taiwan's competitiveness
in international trade also note that in recent
years, imports grew significantly faster than ex-
ports, which led to a decline in the trade surplus
from $19 billion in 1987 to $9.5 billion in 1992.
However, the faster pace of import growth pri-
mariiy reflected Taiwan's major trade liberaliza-
tion since 1985. More importantly, the decline in
the trade surplus was a much-needed correction
to the excessively large annual trade surpluses
that amounted to 20 percent of its output in
1986-1987.
Adjustment policies
A maturing economy requires adjustments by
both business and government. Firms accus-
tomed to high demand growth and abundant
supplies of labor and land at low costs must seek
products that have higher capital and technology
content. With the days of inexpensive world
technology fast disappearing, they must be pre-
pared either to pay higher prices for technology
or to allocate an increasing share of their budget
to R&D expenditures. Workers have to learn
newskills ina rapidly changingjobmarket. To
provide the workforce, the government must ori-
ent its education and industrial policies toward
fostering homegrown science and technology
developments. Barriers to domestic and interna-
tional competition must be lowered or removed
in order to enhance allocative efficiency and
serve as an additional source of economic
growth. Finally, there must be investment in
infrastructure in order to remove bottlenecks to
growth and efforts to enhance the environment
to improve the quality of life-especially in
economies like Taiwan's, where these endeav-
ors have lagged behind the economy's output
growth.
Indeed, in recent years Taiwan's economic pol-
icies do appear to be directed toward these
goals. Beginning in 1984, the authorities abol-
ished import quotas and lowered import tariffs to
an average rate of 5 percent by 1992, compara-
ble to those among industrial countries. In 1987,
almost aii exchange controls were lifted; by
1992, the currency became fully convertible. In
1989, a new banking law opened the market to
private banks, abolished interest rate controls,
and liberalized restrictions on the scope of bank-
ing operations. In 1992, the entire financial
market-including banking, securities, and
insurance-was opened to foreign entry.
In 1990, the government announced a Six-Year
National Development Plan to invest more than
$300 billion from 1991 to 1997 in three broad in-
frastructure areas: transportation and communi-
cations; urban residential construction, energy,
and social welfare; and education, science and
technology, and environmental protection. In
1993, the plan was augmented by a 29-point
"implementation program;' which specifies the
details of an action plan to facilitate and expedite
the restructuring of the economy.
These large public-investment programs already
have borne fruit. In 1992, domestic private fixed
investment rose 19 percent, reversing the decline
of the preceding two years. The increase contrib-
uted more than public investment to the econ-
omy's output growth for the first time in the last
four years.
Taiwan's development program is not without dif-
ficulties. The large public-investment expend-
itures have necessitated the issuance of a very
substantial amount of government bonds, meet~
ing resistance from legislators who are used to
balanced budgets. In addition, the spending pro-
gram has been made harder to sell by a failure
to distinguish between the government's current
spending and capital investments. In response to
these concerns, the total expenditure under the
Six-Year Plan was reduced this year by 27 per-
cent. Nevertheless, by and large, the adjustment
program remains on track.
Conclusion
Success in economic development can be a two-
edged sword. In Taiwan, it has raised the overall
standard of living, but at the same time has in-
flicted pains of adjustment as the economy ma-
tures. Appropriate governmentpolicies are needed
to facilitate the adjustment and dispel business
pessimism based on misinterpretation ofeco-
nomic signals. Failure to carry out these policies
can unduly prolong both the adjustment pains
and unwarranted market pessimism.
Hang-Sheng Cheng
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